Russia After Putin
Full transcript
Dr. Pavel Podvig:
This is the panel with the great title, Russia After Putin. My name is Padel Podvig. I'm here as a, as an independent researcher working in Geneva on my own research project. I do mostly things related to nuclear weapons. But as any Russian living outside of Russia, I am involved to this topic. So before I invite the panelists to the to their chairs. I would like to start with the brief introductory movie. We'll have a brief clip from the World Forum, and then we will havea clip from the movie that was directed and produced by one of our panelists, Marianna Yarovskaya , who is the Russian American filmmaker, about Lyubov Sobol.
Thank you very much. And we will start with Vladimir Kara-Murza, who probably needs no introduction today, because we've all heard a very nice introduction yesterday when Vladimir received the award. But he's a historian by his profession, and he is also one of the most notable political activists in Russian activists living abroad. So Vladimir, the floor is yours for the opening keynote remarks.
Vladimir Kara-Murza:
Thank you so much. Thank you to everyone who's here. And I want to thank the Cinema for Peace Foundation for bringing us all together for this year's World Forum. I want to especially thank the organizers for including a panel discussion on this topic Russia after Putin, and Jaka Bizilj, who is there. Thank you for making this topic a part of the conversation, because I believe this is one of the most important topics that we not only can, but have to discuss.
Now, this has been the first topic of conversation over the past seven months with all the heads of state and government I've had the honor of meeting since being released from prison—including with Chancellor Scholz here, President Macron, Prime Minister Starmer, and others. And it was very important for me that they are thinking about this question too.
This never came as a surprise. Often, when I try to raise this subject in a public setting such as this one, I see surprise in some people’s eyes: “Why should we be talking about Russia after Putin? There doesn't seem to be any change.” To which I always respond, as you just said in your introduction to this panel, I’m a historian—and the one thing we do know about the modern history of Russia is how quickly, how suddenly, and how unexpectedly major political change can come.
There is a very good book I recommend to anyone interested in Russian history. It’s about the final years of the Soviet system in the late '80s and early '90s, published by the University of California, Berkeley, last year. It's by the prominent sociologist Alexei Yurchak, and I absolutely love the title: "Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More"—because that's exactly how it was. Those of us old enough to remember the end of the Soviet Union can attest to that. This is how things always happen in Russia.
As you might guess from my biography, I'm not a fan of Vladimir Lenin, and I'm not known for quoting him—but there is one speech I often refer to. It’s one he gave to young Social Democrats in Zurich, Switzerland. He ended that speech with these famous words: "We old folks will not live to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution." He said this on January 22, 1917. And we all know what happened shortly after that.
This is why it is absolutely imperative that we not only think about Russia after Putin—but prepare for it. Because one of the biggest problems with all previous instances of sudden political change in Russia is that people were simply not ready—not mentally, not practically. Nobody had even considered it, because of course, the regime was supposed to last forever. It was forever—until it wasn’t.
That’s why so many mistakes were made during those rare windows of opportunity for democratic change. That’s why, in my view, the chance in 1917 was squandered so badly by the Provisional Government. And it’s also why the chance for a true democratic transition in the 1990s was missed.
In the summer of 2023, we began a kind of public discussion—if that’s the right term—on this topic with Alexei Navalny. He published an article from prison in the Vladimir region in August 2023 about the mistakes made in Russia in the 1990s. I responded with my own article in September. Others joined the conversation. And we all began by making one thing clear: this was not just a historical reflection. It was a conversation about the future.
Because we must learn from past mistakes to avoid repeating them. We looked at all the "underwater stones"—the unseen traps—that led us to where we are today, to ensure we don’t step on them again.
In my view, there were two major mistakes made in the 1990s—one domestic, and one international. Let’s start with the domestic, because it was the most important.
Every country that has successfully transitioned from dictatorship to democracy—whether South Africa after apartheid, Argentina after the junta, Central and Eastern Europe after communism, or Germany after 1945 and again after 1989—has gone through a process of public reckoning with the crimes of the past.
The formats varied: truth commissions, tribunals, lustrations. But two themes were always the same: transparency and accountability.
It was essential that society be made aware of the crimes committed in its name—and that the people responsible be held accountable. Because we know from history: when evil is not confronted, condemned, and dealt with—it returns.
This is exactly what happened in Russia. In my view, the greatest failure of the 1990s democratic government under President Boris Yeltsin was that it never went through this process. There was never full declassification of the Soviet and KGB archives. They remain classified even today. There was no justice for the crimes of the past, even for the most horrific ones.
By 1991, there were still organizers of the Katyn massacre alive—those responsible for the murder of the Polish army officers in 1940. There were people who had personally tortured political prisoners still walking free. Nothing happened to them. And, of course, there were no lustrations like in the Baltic states or former Czechoslovakia, where individuals involved in repression were barred from returning to power.
To be clear—this is not hindsight. There were people at the time, in the early '90s, loudly calling for these reforms.
Galina Starovoitova, a democratic leader from St. Petersburg, introduced a bill in the Russian Parliament twice that would have banned senior Communist Party and KGB officials from holding power. That bill wasn’t even considered.
Vladimir Bukovsky, a legendary dissident and political prisoner, went from office to office in the Kremlin and Presidential Administration, urging the government to open the KGB archives. He was ignored. His pleas fell on deaf ears.
There is one key document I urge everyone to read: a dissenting opinion by Russian Constitutional Court Justice Anatoly Kononov, published on November 30, 1992, related to the case of the Communist Party. The ruling itself was toothless, but Kononov’s opinion was powerful and clear. And Kononov wrote his own dissenting opinion, in which he argued very forcefully, backed by details and references to international law, for holding a real judicial tribunal for all the crimes committed by the Communist regime. He based this on existing international statutes, including conventions to which the Soviet Union itself was a party—such as the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and all the relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The USSR was a signatory to these conventions, and yet, needless to say, violated them every single day of its existence.
But that was, of course, a dissenting opinion. It did not carry legal force.
So there were people at the time who warned that if this process of accountability was not undertaken, there would be consequences. When Vladimir Bukovsky received his final “no” from President Yeltsin’s administration, he shook his head. Yeltsin’s officials told him that what he was proposing - lustrations, trials, opening of the archives—amounted to a witch hunt. Bukovsky simply replied, "Then in a few years’ time, the witches are going to come back—and they’re going to start hunting us."
And that, of course, is exactly what happened. Because as we know, when evil is not publicly reflected on, not publicly accounted for, not publicly condemned—it will return.
Just eight short years after the Russian democratic revolution of 1991, a former Soviet KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, came to power. He began his rule symbolically in December 1999 by unveiling a memorial plaque to Yuri Andropov on the Lubyanka building—the former site of the KGB headquarters. Andropov epitomized everything that was wrong with the Soviet regime: domestic repression and external aggression.
And very quickly, let me turn to the second major mistake—a more international one—that played a negative role in the failure of democratic reforms in the 1990s.
Unlike many former Warsaw Pact countries and other nations of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia never had the promise of Euro-Atlantic integration. In places like Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, this promise served as a powerful incentive for reform. That light at the end of the tunnel—the hope of rejoining the family of European nations—was the most motivating force for pushing through difficult democratic and economic reforms.
When Václav Havel spoke to the U.S. Congress in 1990, he called the post-communist transformation of Czechoslovakia ‘our return to Europe.’ That’s how it was seen. But Russia never had that.
In fact, when President Boris Yeltsin sent a formal letter to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner on December 20, 1991—raising for the first time the possibility of Russia joining NATO—he never even received a response.
Years later, while researching this for an article, I went through archives—the Library of Congress, historical newspaper clippings, official documents—trying to understand how such a monumental proposal could go unanswered. The reason? Western officials were so shocked by the idea that no one had even thought about it, because the assumption was that the Soviet regime would last forever.
They were too taken aback to offer a coherent response. That’s a direct quote from a New York Times article at the time.
And the consequences of that silence—we are still living with them today.
We cannot afford to repeat the same mistakes the next time there is a window of opportunity for democratic change in Russia.
Domestically, there must be accountability. There must be transparency. War crimes committed by Putin’s regime in Ukraine, crimes committed against the Russian people—such as the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, the assassination of Alexei Navalny, the persecution of hundreds of political prisoners—must be acknowledged. They must be investigated. They must be condemned. There must be justice.
And internationally, the West must be ready. Ready with a real roadmap for helping a post-Putin Russia transition to democracy. Ready to offer real assistance and a clear path toward integration into the rules-based international system and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Because as long as there is a regime in the Kremlin that tramples on the rights of its own people, it will never respect international law. It will never respect borders. Domestic repression and external aggression go hand in hand.
It is in all our interests that a democratic, peaceful, and law-abiding Russia emerges. A Russia that respects its own people. A Russia that respects its neighbors. Only with a democratic Russia can we have true, lasting peace and stability on the European continent.
None of us—no one in this room or elsewhere—knows when that opportunity will come. But it will. Because nothing is forever. Mr. Putin is not forever.
And we must be ready.
Thank you.
Dr. Pavel Podvig:
Thank you very much.So let's move on with our panelists. The next speaker is Gennady Gudkov, who's a Russian opposition politician.
Gennady Gudkov:
Thank you very much. My English is not as good as Vladimir’s. But I do have one advantage: I worked with Putin. I met him several times. I also worked with and was personally acquainted with Mr. Gorbachev.
Of course, we spoke a lot about the situation in the Soviet Union and in Russia when he was General Secretary of the Communist Party. And in my view, the main mistake was made in 1993. I would like to respectfully debate Vladimir on this point.
You may remember these events. I certainly do. I remember them very clearly.
That was the moment when the Russian parliament was shelled with tanks. And two months later, a new constitution was adopted, which gave absolute political power to the President. No parliamentary control, no investigative committees, no coalition governments, a completely dependent judiciary—and the rest followed.
From that moment on, it was only a matter of time before a future president could turn Russia into any kind of country he wanted. President Yeltsin did not wish to go that far—but when Putin read this Constitution, he realized he had more power than any monarch in medieval Europe or Central Asia.
So while it’s important to discuss, as Vladimir said, what to do with Russia after Putin, you know… this question often causes a bit of sarcasm among us in the political emigration community.
Because yes, it’s good to speak about “Russia after Putin,” but unfortunately, Putin is still in the Kremlin. And we are here. We have lost our country.
And unless we defeat Putin, unless we win this war against his regime, that “day after” will never come. Not in 10 years, not in 20. Especially with modern medicine—he might live another decade or more.
So I will speak about things that may not be pleasant.
There’s a Russian joke:
The optimist learns English.
The pessimist learns Chinese.
The realist learns how to use a Kalashnikov.
Maybe I’m a realist.
That’s why I want to speak about more real things.
First of all, we—the Russian political emigration—are not as divided as many people think. We have no real disagreements on the vision for the future of Russia.
We all want a democratic republic, with a coalition government, no strong presidency, an independent judiciary, independent media, human rights, and integration with Europe—perhaps even NATO, if NATO survives Trump. On these things, we all agree.
The dream is there. But the dream will never become reality as long as Putin remains in the Kremlin.
So the key question is not just “What comes after Putin?” but rather:
“How do we end Putin’s regime?”
Because talking about post-Putin Russia without a strategy to get there is like discussing a shark soup recipe when no one has caught the shark—and no one knows who will catch whom.
We are lost. We lost the country. And now we are forced to think about how to change Russia—without any power to do so.
I want to remind you: The Soviet Union was defeated in 1991. But it was not just defeated by internal forces—it was defeated by the entire free, democratic world. There was a strategy. There were coordinated efforts. Millions of people stood behind this effort.
It started with Churchill’s speech in Fulton. It was the Cold War. And the Cold War ended with the full defeat of Communism in 1991.
So I want to ask a very simple question:
Does the free, democratic world today have any plan, strategy, or intention to deal with Putin’s regime?
Unfortunately, in my experience—no.
I’ve asked this question many times, in various institutions across Europe and the United States. And I have yet to hear a clear answer.
The Russian opposition, the Russian political emigration, the democratic forces—we cannot defeat Putin alone.
Without international support, it is impossible.
It is the same in Iran, Afghanistan, and many other places suffering under authoritarian regimes.
So, if we want to talk seriously about Russia’s future, Western countries must first make a clear decision:
Are they friends of Putin—or are they fighting against his regime?
This gray zone, this state of uncertainty, is unsustainable. That is the key message I want to deliver to Western politicians, leaders, and societies.
Because as long as Putin remains in power, Europe will never have lasting peace, safety, or stability.
There will always be the threat of a new destructive war—maybe even a nuclear one.
Putin supports everything that stands in the way of peaceful life.
He supports global terrorism, authoritarian regimes, dictatorships. He supports every force that destabilizes our world.
So that’s why I say this:
Western democracies must create a new strategy.
A new doctrine of containment. A new plan of deterrence.
If we do not do this, then there is no point in talking about “Russia after Putin”—because after Putin, there will just be… another Putin.
Thank you very much.
Dr. Pavel Podvig:
Thank you. Gennady, I think it's especially interesting to hear after we all been reading news about the conversations between the presidents. I think it's, you can see that this is a very fluid situation, and there are many questions there, so I'll give floor next to Marina Ovsiannikova, who is the Russian journalist now, political refugee. She has a personal story.
Marina Ovsiannikova:
Thank you so much.
I want to say something very important: Propaganda often tries to show that all Russians support Putin—that we are all united around him. But that is simply not true. The truth is, most Russians today are scared.
We just watched a short video about Sobol. That video shows the reality of life in Russia.
Because the exact same thing happened to me—they broke down my door at 6 a.m.
It’s always the same story: they come early in the morning. It’s meant to shock and scare. That’s Russian reality. That’s what people live with. The population is deeply afraid.
But I want to speak specifically from my own experience—about my former colleagues at Channel One.
I would say that before the war started, maybe 20 or 30% of my former colleagues truly supported Putin. But the other 70 to 80% understood exactly what was happening.They could see it clearly.
In the newsroom, on the wall, they had television screens showing Sky News, CNN, other international channels. They watched them daily. They knew the truth. They understood the situation perfectly. They don’t support this regime. But they continued working because they were forced to play by the Kremlin’s rules.
They knew they couldn’t find another job as journalists in Russia. Not one that would allow them to speak freely. To be an independent journalist, you have to leave the country. And that is a very difficult personal decision.
Most of them have elderly parents. They have children. They have responsibilities. So, they stay. They keep playing the game, even though they know what’s right and what’s wrong. I believe that many of them are just waiting—waiting for the situation in Russia to reach a turning point, a bifurcation point, when real change becomes possible.
These people—my former colleagues—they believe in European values. They believe in human rights. They used to travel across Europe before the war. And after the war began, they lost that freedom. They lost that connection to the wider world. And now, I think many of them are depressed. They’ve entered a kind of internal exile. They are waiting. Waiting for the regime to show cracks, waiting for an opportunity to support democratic change. And I truly believe, when that moment comes, they will be ready. They will stand with democratic forces. They will stand for human rights and for freedom. Thank you so much.
Dr. Pavel Podvig:
So now I I'm glad to introduce Marianna Yarovskaya, the filmmaker who is behind the movie of The Women of gulag, but the other movie is about our next panelist, Lubov Sobol, so I would suggest Mariana, you just start and give us kind of your remarks, and then we turn to Lubov to hear from her.
Marianna Yarovskaya:
Thank you so much. You’ve just seen the opening moments of a film I’ve been working on for the past two and a half—almost three—years. It’s a film that is mostly about hope, but also about courage and resilience.
We open with Lyubov Sobol. She is someone who has endured nearly 20 arrests. She went on a hunger strike for a month, which she was eventually forced to end—not for her own sake, but because of concerns for the safety of her colleague, who might not have survived if she continued. She almost lost her husband to poisoning.
She lost her closest friend and ally, Alexei Navalny. Luba was not just an activist—she was Navalny’s very first employee. She was his closest partner, his trusted friend. While Navalny was still in prison, he urged her to leave Russia. “You have a young daughter,” he told her. “You can be more useful outside the country than inside.”
And so, she made that difficult decision—to continue the fight from exile. That is what this film is about. It’s about the people who refuse to give up. The ones who keep going, even when it seems impossible. The ones who still believe in a better Russia, despite everything. One of our main consultants for the film is someone I deeply admire: Sergei Guriev. He’s now the head of the London School of Economics, and in my view, he’s one of the most insightful and successful Russian dissidents living in exile today. Sergei appears briefly in the film, and he says something powerful. He says he does not believe that “Putinism” will survive after Putin. He’s actually very optimistic about Russia’s future. But I am not a politician. I am not an economist. So now, I will pass the floor to Lyuba Sobol herself.
Dr. Pavel Podvig":
Okay, thank you. Thank you and Lyuba, you're we can see you on the screen. So please, the floor is yours, and we, we are happy to have you.
Lyubov Sobo:
Hello everyone, and thank you.Many people today are discussing the possibility of a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. But I am convinced that there can be no lasting peace while Vladimir Putin remains in power. Putin’s goal is not just the annexation of parts of Ukraine like Avdiivka— His goal is total control, including Kyiv. And the only way to truly guarantee Ukraine’s security, and Europe’s security, is through a deep democratization of Russia.
Now, can Russia become a democracy? I believe—absolutely, yes. But that will only be possible after Vladimir Putin is gone.And we don’t know when or how that moment will come— because in dictatorships, such changes are always unpredictable. But no one stays in power forever.And I completely agree with Vladimir Kara-Murza:
Putin’s regime will eventually end—just like other dictatorships before it, including the one in Syria.
What’s important now is to focus on what must be done first. Beyond ending the war in Ukraine and stopping all forms of external aggression, Russia must begin serious reforms—starting with its security services, which today function as a political police and are among the biggest beneficiaries of corruption. All political prisoners must be immediately released. There should also be a broad amnesty for people imprisoned for non-violent economic crimes.Another crucial step is to legalize and register opposition parties, and to allow them to participate freely and fairly in elections.I am confident that if these changes are made, a stable and lasting democracy in Russia is not only possible—it is inevitable. Thank you.
Dr. Pavel Podvig:
Okay, and last but not least, I'm glad to see that we have another panelist, Maria Alyokhina, who is very well known as a member of the Pussy Riot collective. So Masha, The floor is yours to give us your vision of Russia after Putin.
Maria Alyokhina:
For me, it’s honestly a little bit difficult to talk about something that doesn’t exist right now.
I don’t know how many people will agree with me, but in my view, the main condition for any free future—for Russia, and for the world—is the survival of Ukraine.
This war has been going on for three years,and the whole world is watching. If Ukraine loses—in front of the eyes of the international community, it will be a signal to this regime that they can continue their aggression with impunity. It might sound banal, but we’ve already seen that Putin doesn’t stop. Look at Belarus, where he has full control through his close ally, the dictator Lukashenko. Look at what’s happening in Georgia—They are now trying to change the government, and take over from within.
Many of my friends, who had to flee Russia due to criminal charges and political persecution, moved to Georgia for safety, and now, they’re being forced to leave again. Just like they left Russia.
Last year, during the protests in Georgia,people were brutally beaten by police—some with broken bones. And Russian activists who simply joined these protests were thrown in jail. And the world barely noticed.
And then there’s North Kazakhstan, which Putin already implies is "Russian" territory. Or Moldova, which may also become a target. If all of this happens in silence, then there will be no free Russia—and there will be no free world.
In my opinion, what we are witnessing is a desperate and dangerous attempt to rebuild the Soviet Union,
using every resource available, no matter the cost. Europe needs to understand:the countries under attack must be protected—and not just with words. The United States, right now, is fighting its own internal battle.
So it’s time for Europe to step up and understand what kind of threat they are facing. This regime’s machine of repression is not new. It’s been alive for more than a hundred years— from the Cheka, to the KGB, to the FSB. It has never stopped. And it has no plans to stop now.Thank you. Thank you very much.
Dr. Pavel Podvig 46:29
We do have a few minutes before our panelists leave, so let me start the discussion by asking a question for analysis. I’ll begin with Gennady, but I invite all the panelists to contribute if they’d like.Vladimir mentioned that one of the issues that didn’t work out after the breakup of the Soviet Union was the lack of a clear path for Russia’s integration into the larger world—particularly into Europe. So I want to ask a deliberately provocative question:While there’s a strong argument for building a united front to confront Russia as it exists today, is there a risk that this very confrontation—through military buildup and international isolation—could actually freeze the authoritarian regime in place?Could such an approach, instead of dismantling authoritarianism, end up reproducing the same kind of KGB-led system we are dealing with now? Gennady, as someone who strongly supports this strategy, how do you see it working in practice?
Gennady Gudkov 48:25
This strategy a kind of a new Cold War. I say this because we’ve already seen the outcome of Trump–Putin negotiations. What we require is a new doctrine for containing Russia. This means we must formulate clear plans to—let me say it directly—create the conditions for the collapse of the Putin regime.
We need to undermine this regime from within. Of course, we cannot remove Putin ourselves—that can only be done by Russians inside the country. This means we must find and support allies within Russia.
We do not believe a revolution is possible in the near future. There are simply no conditions for such a movement right now. What could happen, however, is an inter-elite coup d’état—nothing more.
There was a moment of real opportunity. I remember very well the year 2023—many representatives of the Russian elite went abroad seeking dialogue, solutions, and support. They were looking for a way out and were ready to make contact.
What did they receive in response?
Nothing.
No guarantees. No clear answers about what should be done or how the Western coalition would ensure their safety—whether through sanctions or other means.
We completely lost the opportunity for dialogue with the Russian elites in 2023. I know this for a fact. I won’t go into the details of who made which mistakes, but the fact remains—we lost it.
Now, Russian elites are being forced to consolidate around Putin. They’ve been compelled to bring their capital back into the country—tens of billions of dollars, by the way—strengthening the regime.
In 2024, they stayed in a kind of standby mode—waiting to see the results of the U.S. election campaign, waiting to see what Europe would decide, what support would go to Ukraine.
Now, Putin is in a very strong position domestically. But that doesn’t mean that all Russian elites support his political direction. Far from it.
If we create a real strategy—if we start a dialogue with those who are dissatisfied with Putin’s policies—we can begin the work that must be done.
We do not believe that Putin's regime will last much longer—if we act.
If we don’t act, however, he could remain in power for another 20 years or more.
And those would be 20 years of immense danger: more military conflicts, more wars, more nuclear blackmail against the world.
If we don’t start this work, if we don’t find allies—we will never see a Russia after Putin. Thank you.
Dr. Pavel Podvig 53:14
I have a follow-up question—one that isn’t really far-fetched, especially given the events we witnessed in the summer of 2023. We may not have seen a full-blown rebellion, but we definitely saw signs of unrest.
So, what if this internal process that might eventually unfold in Russia brings to power someone who isn’t exactly anti-Putin? I’m not necessarily talking about a figure like Prigozhin, but someone in that vein—someone who represents change, but not a real break from the current regime.
I understand—and Vladimir articulated this very well—that there’s a clear list of steps needed to truly close the door on authoritarianism in Russia. But what if those steps aren’t immediately possible because the new leadership isn’t all that different from the old one?
So my question is: Is there a plan for this kind of scenario? What could or should be done if there’s largely continuity, but also a small window of opportunity for real change?
Gennady Gudkov 54:50
The main idea expressed here is that the removal of Vladimir Putin from power in Russia is seen as an essential step toward initiating reform and political change. There’s a strong belief that after Putin’s removal, a period of transition will be necessary, lasting around one and a half to two years. During this time, some members of the current Russian elites—those who have not committed violent crimes—could play a role in the reform process, helping to build a new political system. The idea is that the new leadership will need to communicate with Western countries to initiate negotiations and bring about significant change.
The conversation also touches upon the notion of "Putinism without Putin." The speaker argues that Putin's regime is highly personalistic, meaning that without him at the top, the system itself will fundamentally change. This contrasts with other regimes, like those in China or Cuba, where leadership changes do not necessarily result in significant shifts in policy. The speaker notes that although the successor to Putin may not be an ideal democratic leader, the regime will inevitably shift direction, especially since the current system has been built around political repression, no free elections, no independent media, and antagonism with the West.
This transition period would provide an opportunity for genuinely democratic forces to assert themselves, but it will be brief, as such moments of opportunity typically are. Therefore, it is emphasized that a clear roadmap or plan for the post-Putin era is crucial to avoid missing this chance for reform.
Vladimir Karamurza 56:26
No, I actually generally agree, and I want to thank you so much for allowing us to discuss this point. The introduction video before our panel mentioned, "What if it's Putinism without Putin afterward?" And to the sense of your question, what if it's something equally bad?
Again, I want to answer, as a historian, by rewinding 200 years from now, to the early 19th century. If you look at these 200 years, you will find that, with one significant but unique exception — Stalin after Lenin — every other time there was a change of leadership in Russia, even when it was just a dynastic change from father to son in the Russian Empire, or even when there was a change like after Stalin to Khrushchev within the Communist regime, every single time — again, with that one exception — the successor turned around the policy completely and built his entire political course on the repudiation of what was happening before. This is our tradition. So, it's impossible to have Putinism without Putin.
This is a very personalistic regime. This is not an ideological dictatorship like in China, for example, or in Cuba, where you can change leaders, and the basis will stay the same. This is a regime that its own leaders call the vertical of power. That’s their own term, and that vertical goes up to one single individual at the top. As soon as that individual, in one way or another, is removed from that top, everything will be different.
Now, that’s not to say that whoever comes after Putin from within this regime will be Andrei Sakharov, of course not, but it will be somebody. And I completely agree with what Gennady just said: it will be somebody who will, from the first moment, start doing everything the opposite of what has been done under the current regime. They will need to reverse the 25-year direction of political repression, no free elections, no independent media, no parliament, no judiciary, and confrontation with the Western democratic world.
Whoever comes after will start reversing this, and that will create a window of opportunity for genuinely democratic forces. This period of transition will be very short. By definition, these windows of opportunity are brief, as they were in the early '90s, as they were in 1917, and in 1905 to an extent. And this is why I keep hammering this point: we need to have that roadmap. We need to have that plan for the day after Putin, because when the day comes, it will be too late.
Lyuba Sobol 59:56
I think that everybody is better than Putin. Everybody and even chaos is better than Putin. I really think so.
Dr. Pavel Podvig 1:00:16
Yeah, well, since my real job is following various developments related to nuclear weapons, I would probably disagree with the idea that cows are better than Putin because there are some dangerous weapons around that need to be taken care of.
Vladimir Kara-Murza 1:00:40
But at the same time, they have a deranged madman, an old Soviet KGB officer, in charge of those weapons, as the world is seeing now.
Dr. Pavel Podvig 1:00:48
That’s a fair point. At the same time, I think, just to add a note of optimism to this particular point, I believe this may apply to other areas as well. But if you look at the entire nuclear enterprise, the nuclear complex, including the military units that actually handle the weapons and manage them, it’s interesting to note that these are fairly strong institutional structures. They have a certain level of strength that I hope would prevent the worst from happening, even in a situation of general chaos, which, I would agree, is indeed a possibility.
Do we have a questions? Yes, please.
Jaka Bizilj (audience) 1:02:14
Prigozhin was incredibly successful in his march to Moscow. What does that say about how weak or strong Putin is? Did part of the army actually sabotage the effort? Did they let Prigozhin move forward? It seemed unbelievable to us, and it appeared that Prigozhin stopped only because of some kind of deal, which likely ended with his death. But it seemed to us that it could have continued. So, how strong or weak is Putin, and what role do the forces that made this possible play, especially the forces involved at that time? What role do they have today?
Vladimir Kara-Murza 1:00:40
Thank you so much for the question. I remember that day very well. It was a Saturday, the day of the Prigozhin coup. I was in a cell with just one cellmate. There were only two of us, and I was still in Moscow in the Sizovia, the Vodnik prison. My cellmate had this horrendous custom: he would always watch Vladimir Solovyov and the Russian TV propaganda every single day. I was setting up with my lawyers, but if we hadn't been kicked out of the Council of Europe, I should have launched a complaint under the article on torture because listening to these guys every day was unbearable. But he was, so I’d wake up, and the TV would already be switched on.
That day, though, something was strange. They were showing tanks and armored vehicles outside of Moscow. They showed Putin with a pale face and fear in his eyes, standing in his Kremlin office, pronouncing some really crazy words like "treason" and "insurrection." Obviously, I didn’t understand what was going on because they weren’t showing the full picture. They were only reporting the regime’s response to the insurrection, not actually covering the insurrection itself.
Then, even stranger things began happening. Suddenly, the director of the prison and the head of the security department came in. It was a Saturday, which was unprecedented—they never come in on the weekend. They looked pretty scared, too, and they led me to an office and sat me down. They said, "We want to have a conversation." Just a day or two before, it was the usual routine—do this, do that. But suddenly, they were really polite. They asked, "How are you feeling? Is everything okay? How are you finding the conditions?" I said, "What’s happening? Why are you asking this?" And that’s when they told me about the Prigozhin coup. They said the troops weren’t just 150 kilometers from Moscow; they had already taken over the city of Rostov-on-Don and everything else.
I learned all of this from the prison authorities. And I had to really work hard to stop myself from laughing when I saw the fear on their faces. Well, this just proves the point we started this conversation with. This is how things change in Russia. Who could have predicted this, even the evening before? No one. And this is how it happens. Suddenly, all these prison directors were incredibly polite because they didn’t know what was going to happen—whether Prigozhin was going to take over. They started asking me questions like, "How is it possible that Prigozhin was Putin’s ally for so long? How could he turn against him?"
Yes, this is how things happen, not just in Russia, but in Russia, too. Of course, as we know, that insurrection didn’t succeed. You’re absolutely right to point out that they stopped because they thought they had made a deal with Putin. But that deal ended when Putin had Prigozhin’s plane shot down, killing him and the entire leadership of the Wagner Group. This means one very important thing: whoever comes next is not going to stop, because they’re not going to trust Putin’s word anymore.
Alex (audience) 1:05:48
I'm Alex, a member of the UK Parliament and Chair of the Ukraine Group in the UK Parliament. We know that Russia is now spending billions of dollars on defense, and that, in combination with Western sanctions, is having a very negative effect on its ability to function economically. When you talk about the splitting of the elite, is this a factor that might lead to the elite staging a coup against Putin, or is it more about the restriction of freedoms? Or is it a combination of factors that could trigger a coup by the Russian elite?
Maria Alyokhina 1:06:33
I want to first add one very important point about Prigozhin. The main factor in this rebellion is that he had a personal army, and they all had weapons. Without that, no revolution is possible. He had the resources to go and stage this march.
As for Ukraine, I actually came here from Ukraine, where I spent two months before the full-scale invasion. I had been visiting the country every year, but this was the first time since 2022. What I saw... I mean, it's unbelievable how this country is still fighting, and how all these people are keeping kindness inside them. Every person I met in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Izyum, and Odessa — everyone. People in cafes, in taxis, in bars — all of them, despite living under a curfew. It made me think about Moscow: how long could the city survive if the conditions in Russia were the same as in Ukraine? How long would people stay silent under those circumstances? But yeah, that was just a side note.
Vladimir Kara-Murza 1:08:56
On this question, if I may briefly add, I think that people in Putin's closest entourage hate him more than they hate us. The entire purpose for many of them has been to steal from Russia and stash away that money in the West. They operated like this for years — buying villas, yachts, and apartments in Western countries, sending their kids to schools there, and their wives and mistresses on shopping trips. We’ve been fighting this for years with measures like the Magnitsky Act, which was a tough battle. We had some successes, but when the full-scale invasion began, many of these sanctions were ramped up beyond the Magnitsky mechanism. With special legal regimes introduced because of the invasion, these individuals suddenly lost everything — or at least the things that mattered to them. They still have those villas and yachts, but they can no longer access them. Their bank accounts are frozen, and they can no longer enjoy weekend trips to Paris.
This loss, not out of any benevolence or political change, but purely for selfish reasons, has led to a widespread desire within the ruling establishment for normalization. This is why what Trump is doing now is so damaging: he is sending signals that there could be normalization with Putin when, in fact, there cannot be, and there should not be, until this murderer is removed from the Kremlin.
However, on the topic of sanctions, I have to say that even with a full-scale invasion, we see how poorly these mechanisms are being implemented. For example, up until last year, the wife of Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister, Timur Ivanov, was living in her Paris apartment while the war was ongoing. Last year, Putin’s grandniece, who is also the Deputy Minister of Defense, was freely traveling throughout the European Union. How is that possible? Last autumn, the son of Vladimir Tikov, who is number two at Rosoboronexport (Russia's state arms exporter), took his girlfriend to Milan for a weekend trip to La Scala, while the war in Ukraine was still ongoing. How is that possible?
These types of sanctions need to be strengthened, and the mechanisms for their enforcement need to be improved. It is unacceptable that this is happening. At the same time, we must avoid going to the other extreme. Unfortunately, some countries on the Eastern flank of the European Union have imposed blanket bans on all Russian passport holders — no visas, no entry, no travel. The Kremlin loves this. I can attest to this because, when I was in prison, I had a radio in my cell and heard the reports every time another Eastern EU country imposed these kinds of measures. The Kremlin uses this as propaganda, claiming that the West doesn't just hate the Putin regime, they hate all Russians. This is exactly the message they want to send.
This is unacceptable. We cannot discriminate against people based on the color of their passport. The only ones benefiting from this blanket approach are Putin’s propaganda and the regime. Independent human rights lawyers, journalists, and civil society activists suffer the most from these bans. They can’t travel anymore, they can’t do their work. Russians who are helping Ukrainians escape from war zones can't get through borders because of their Russian number plates. How does this restrict Putin's war effort? It actually strengthens his propaganda.
So, while I agree there should be stronger, better-enforced sanctions, they need to be more targeted. Blanket measures do more harm than good and only support the Putin regime’s narrative.
Henry (audience) 1:13:18
Before I start, I want to thank everyone for your great vision and insights, especially for shedding light on the challenges that neighboring countries like Kazakhstan and Georgia are facing.
My name is Henry, and I’m with the Pardee School. My question is related to the future generation of Russia. One of the articles in The New York Times pointed out that young people in Russia have a very high level of support for Putin’s regime, to the point where some might even consider them a "lost generation."
To secure democracy, support from just our generation is far from enough. We need a strong civil society and civic education. What measures can we take to help the next generation of Russians learn how to live in a civil society and break free from this malicious cycle?
Vladimir Kara-Murza 1:14:16
First of all, let's please never again mention anything about support and opinion polls and who thinks what—it’s meaningless. Frankly, I don’t want to use harsh words, but discussing opinion polls and measuring support in a totalitarian state like Russia is completely pointless. Let me give you an example. Three months ago, a man in Moscow named Yury Kavyet was sentenced to five years in prison for simply answering a question in an opinion poll saying he was against the war in Ukraine. They identified him, tracked him down, arrested him, and sentenced him to prison for five years for expressing his opinion. And then people still talk about who supports what in Russia—this is absurd. Let's move past this, because all it does is play into Putin's propaganda. There’s no way to accurately judge public opinion in a country where you can be imprisoned for expressing your views.
What we do have are glimpses—glimpses, I would call them—of how many people in Russia actually feel about the war. One such moment happened about a year ago, in February 2024, during the so-called presidential election. Amid this circus, there was a candidate, a lawyer and former member of parliament named Boris Nadezhdin, who announced he was running as an anti-war candidate. He said the war in Ukraine was a tragic mistake and that he would end it on day one. The public response was overwhelming. In cities and towns across Russia, long lines formed at his campaign offices of people, mostly young people, who stood for hours to sign his petition to get him on the ballot. Despite having no money, no media access, and no resources, he gathered 200,000 signatures in just 10 days. And, of course, he was never allowed on the ballot, but that wasn’t the point. This shattered the carefully constructed image that everyone supports the regime and the war. That was fake. People were willing to risk their freedom just to express opposition. You can rig elections, fix opinion polls, but you cannot erase images of hundreds of thousands of people standing in line in the freezing cold to support an anti-war candidate.
I remember my lawyer visiting me in prison and showing me photos of these long lines from social media. One young woman, from the town of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, wrote me a letter saying she waited for three and a half hours in line to sign that petition. She ended the letter by saying, “I never realized how many of us there are,” and this is important. These are the glimpses of reality, the reality checks we see.
To address your second question about what should be done—well, it’s basically the opposite of what the United States is currently doing. Instead of shutting down all broadcasting and democracy assistance, we should be strengthening those efforts. One of the key factors in the collapse of the Soviet regime was that it had become delegitimized in the eyes of its population. And that happened because, in the late 70s, young people—teenagers listening to foreign radio broadcasts like Radio Liberty, BBC Russian, Deutsche Welle—formed the generation that brought down the Soviet regime in 1991. At the end of the day, it was these young people who went to the barricades and fought for change.
One of the most important things we can do is continue to reach people inside Russia, especially the young generation, because they are more tech-savvy and can bypass censorship with VPNs and other methods. Unfortunately, we’ve seen the opposite happening. The U.S. government and major tech companies, like Apple, have been aiding the Putin regime by censoring information. For example, Apple removed over 50 VPN services from its Russian App Store at the request of the Putin government. These apps allowed Russians to bypass censorship and access independent news sources. Apple did this at Putin’s request, and that’s just one example of how Western companies are helping Putin control information. This is unacceptable.
So, instead of shutting down broadcasting and cutting off assistance, the focus should be on supporting independent voices, empowering Russians to access the truth, and ensuring that they can build a civil society. Only then will the next generation have the tools to create change in Russia.
Dr. Pavel Podvig 1:00:48
Okay, before I move on to the questions, let me put Luba on the spot, because I know you. I follow one of your social media accounts, and I know that you're a keen observer of the Russian elite. If I remember correctly, you recently made a comment about the feedback you're receiving from Russian users, who are following your videos and content. In line with what Emer just mentioned, we do have a fairly large number of Russian-language media outlets run by Russians themselves, not by the U.S. government. So, if you could briefly share your thoughts—do you think these efforts are actually reaching audiences in Russia? And do you feel there’s any kind of conversation or feedback happening from people who are watching your content?
Lyubov Sobol 1:21:29
Yes, I run my own YouTube channel, and I have millions of viewers, with 70% of my audience coming from Russia. I had to leave Russia in 2021, but I still have a lot of supporters there, and I can communicate with them through social media. I enjoy staying in touch with them and receiving feedback. For example, I'm always very curious about what's happening in Moscow and in the regions—what people think about the war in Ukraine, the rising prices in grocery stores, and other things. It's difficult to be in exile and still stay connected to the reality in Russia. If you're living in Russia, you can just go to the grocery store and see the prices firsthand. But if you're living abroad, you have to make an effort to stay informed. I like talking to my supporters in Russia to understand what's really going on, because a lot of things have changed since I left my country.
Audience 1:23:10
Naturally, many of the things you mentioned on this panel—such as the corruption, violence, and the disregard for their own people in these countries—along with the insufficient support from the West, have all brought these issues to the forefront. Russia’s geopolitical power has also significantly strengthened many totalitarian regimes around it, including Iran. So, my question for the panel is: How should we think about Russia after Putin, and how does that extend beyond Russia? What could that mean, not just regionally, as Bucha mentioned, but also more geopolitically, for the authoritarian regimes around it that derive so much strength and power from Putin?
Maria Alyokhina 1:24:36
If we continue with this prison talk, I remember the first months of the full-scale invasion. I was basically in jail, in a detention center, so I wasn’t allowed to read any independent news. I only had access to a propaganda radio station. Our cell was full of political activists who had been arrested for participating in single-person demonstrations against the war. We wanted to know every minute what was going on, so we were listening to this propaganda, getting updates every hour.
Somehow, they started airing advertisements before the news, and it sounded like a Russia-Iran scenario. They were talking about Iran and how it had lived under sanctions for so many years. It was almost as if they were preparing themselves and the audience for the same kind of conditions.
I completely agree that it’s impossible to count on any independent opinion or statistics in a war with censorship. In Russia, it's even illegal to call it a war—just referring to it as "the war" is a criminal act. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries that had been, as they say, occupied by the Soviet Union—like the Baltic states—had an easier time articulating their national identity. There was only a small gap of about 10 years between the fall of the Soviet Union and when Putin first took the presidency. That’s just a little over a decade for Russia to figure out what it is and who the Russians actually are. I’m pretty sure the majority of Russians didn’t even have enough time to articulate this identity. A lot of people still identified as Soviet citizens, and suddenly they had to be Russians, but what does that even mean?
There were many people, and still are, who reflected on the history and the terror the Soviet Union inflicted on its own people. But again, 10 years is a very short gap, and then Putin took power and began shutting down media outlets, the oligarchs, independent journalists, etc. From my perspective, it's crucial to protect the independence of those countries that have it. Putin wants to rebuild the dead body of this empire, and it's evident. When he became president, one of the first things he was asked in an interview was what was the worst thing that happened to Russia, and he said the collapse of the Soviet Union. He truly misses it.
But I completely agree that this is a personal dictatorship, not a system like China’s. There aren’t millions of people in Russia who genuinely believe in Putin and his state. Everyone understands that there are thieves and murderers in power. People are simply afraid. For many years, they've been told they are insignificant, that they have no voice, and that if they protest, they will lose everything, even their lives. So, they feel small.
In my opinion, it's crucial to safeguard the independence and voice of those countries that have it, with all the resources Europe has at its disposal. The reality is that these countries could potentially be attacked by armies. I mean, how long would Lithuania or Estonia survive if the Russian army invaded? Three days, perhaps? If Putin takes Ukraine, particularly the central and eastern parts, he would mobilize the Ukrainians and force them to fight against Europe.
Vladimir Karamurza 58:33
To quickly respond to that question, I mentioned earlier that there was never really full transparency in the 1990s, but there was one brief episode in 1992. The Constitutional Court had a hearing where Vladimir Bucha, whom I mentioned earlier, got very limited access to the former Soviet Communist Party Central Committee archive. The documents he obtained were published, and now if you search for the Bucha archive, you'll find a large collection of documents, including translations into English. These documents reveal many things about what the Soviet leadership did, including the support it gave to client regimes and their supporters around the world—everything from Palestinian terrorists to the striking miners in Britain protesting Margaret Thatcher's government, to numerous African countries that were essentially controlled by the Kremlin.
What we saw, in essence, was a dictatorial international network run from Moscow, backed by significant financial and other resources. On a different scale, Putin is doing exactly the same. We can clearly see the "dictators' international" in action. Some of it is even visible today—take Prigozhin, for example. Last year, in July, when Maduro lost the presidential election in Venezuela to Edmundo Gonzalez, there were massive protests in Venezuela, and the Wagner group—Prigozhin’s Russian military power—was sent in to squash them. This same group is also active in seven or eight countries in Africa, including Madagascar and the Central African Republic.
Putin’s regime is closely allied with the Islamic regime in Tehran. They visit each other, call each other, and try to deepen their cooperation. To answer your question: Once the Putin regime falls from power, many countries will be able to breathe more easily, not just those in the region—Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus—but also in places as far as Latin America, Asia, and Southeast Asia. When the archives are fully opened next time, I think we’ll uncover a lot of interesting details, especially about the Kremlin’s support for these client regimes around the world, including Iran.
Marianna Yarovskaya 1:33:16
I actually wanted to revisit the question about young people and Russia after Putin. I want to reiterate the point made by Vladimir. In fact, I worked with your father at the first independent NTV channel and also at Channel One during Yeltsin’s time, as a reporter. The big challenge for young people is that they haven't witnessed the transition from democracy to today’s authoritarian state like my generation has. I’ve seen it happen, and I’ve lived through it, so I know it's possible. But young people today may not be able to see that same transition, which is a challenge they’re facing.
For instance, I’ve seen and filmed a woman conducting anonymous polls. She would call people from America, anonymously asking them what they thought about Putin’s elections, who they would vote for. She called the person they’d vote for “Nader,” which means "hope" in Russia. The only people who picked up the phone and responded were Putin’s supporters, because everyone else was afraid. This shows that you can’t really rely on polls in such an environment.
I also want to reiterate your point about Russian history being cyclical. Putin has selected his Politburo, and there’s no one there with enough charisma to follow in his footsteps. According to my research, and from reading books like "Spin Dictators" by Grieves, there will be no "Putinism" after Putin. But that’s my perspective, as the only person on this panel who hasn't been poisoned. Luba’s husband, for example, was poisoned by Prigozhin’s people, and others have been imprisoned or tortured.
Now, before I move on to the next set of questions, I want to add a bit to the discussion about other countries and perhaps offer a silver lining. We should keep in mind that there is still a reservoir of goodwill toward Russia as a country in many places. Take India, for example, or Iran. Of course, you could argue that this relationship exists because the regimes are similar in many ways, but there are also other factors at play. You could say that this might be a vestige of the Soviet era, where certain progressive policies were seen in a positive light.
For example, in the case of the Iranian nuclear program, Russia has played and continues to play a positive, constructive role in certain instances. So, there is a capacity in Russian institutions that could be constructive and could position Russia as a responsible actor in world affairs. It’s important to recognize that these institutions and individuals do exist, and they are separate from the current Russian leadership. The challenge now is to preserve the healthy elements of Russian government and society, while transforming the country in other ways.
Audience 1:39:39
I'm Elisa from Finland, and in Finland, where we share a very long border with Russia, there is growing national anxiety. I wanted to hear your opinion on how worried we should be. Also, let’s talk about Germany's policy. What about countries like Finland?
Vladimir Kara-Murza 1:40:56
I'll answer the question. I think these are actually important themes to end our conversation on. Regarding your question, to be honest, I haven’t even heard that viewpoint—that we should just let him take Ukraine because it will weaken him and he won’t come for us. That’s the most cynical and misguided approach. To enter a peace treaty as quickly as possible with a freeze would be a huge misunderstanding.
Ukrainians are losing people every single day—civilians, children—being bombed. I think the quicker this stops, the better. That's the only response I can give as a human being. But it’s very important to have real security guarantees for Ukraine. We must understand that for as long as Putin is in power, he will always be a threat. There will always be a possibility of a new war.
So the best we can hope for now, which was the outline of your question, is some kind of temporary ceasefire. And it’s crucial that this temporary ceasefire includes real, or as real as they can be, guarantees that Putin does not attack again in a week or a month. Of all the ideas I’ve heard so far, I think the most realistic and effective one is to have peacekeepers from countries like Britain, France, and several others. Poland has already offered to send military forces there as a kind of “tripwire” (for lack of a better term). Putin will know that if he attacks again, he’ll be attacking not just Ukraine, but all of these countries together. Even if NATO’s Article 5 provision is not formally activated, everyone will still understand it.
This is very, very important. Any ceasefire deal or post-war settlement, whatever we call it, must include provisions for the release of all the captives of this war. We cannot bring back the hundreds of thousands of lives that have been lost because of Putin’s aggression in Ukraine over these last three years, or even over these last 11 years. But there are tens of thousands of people still in captivity because of this war.
Of course, I’m talking about POWs from both sides, which is a given because the third Geneva Convention ensures they must be repatriated. But I’m also talking about Ukrainian civilian hostages, a category not recognized by international humanitarian law, though it’s happening. Russian forces have been abducting civilians and putting them in detention camps. There are thousands of them, and we don’t even know how many. All these people need to be released and returned home.
Ukrainian children, up to 20,000 by some estimates, have been abducted by Russian forces and taken to Russian-controlled territories. These kids need to be returned home. Also, Russian political prisoners—people jailed for opposing the war—are the fastest growing category of political prisoners in Russia. They need to be released. There must be an amnesty provision because for many of these people, it’s not just about unjust imprisonment, but about life or death. They won’t survive unless this happens.
I’m very grateful to prominent human rights NGOs, like the Center for Civil Liberties in Ukraine, led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk, and Memorial from Russia, also a Nobel Peace Prize winner. They’ve launched the "People First" international campaign, calling on Western governments to include this provision in ceasefire negotiations to ensure that the people who can still be saved are saved. This is the most important priority.
As to your question, I would prefer this option. There’s too much talk about territory and assets—raw minerals and whatever else. There’s not enough focus on the people who can still be saved. They must be a priority in any deal made.
I was in Finland in September, and I met with President Niinistö, Prime Minister Marin, and the foreign minister. We had wide-ranging discussions on this very topic. I was happy to hear from them all that the best long-term guarantee for Finland’s security and peace is a democratic neighbor to the east. Finland knows this better than anyone, given its history, particularly the events of 1939-1940. Finland’s senior officials understand that the only real guarantee of security is a normal democratic Russia, not a repressive and belligerent regime.
Your country, more than anyone, should be interested in this and have a roadmap in place for that day. I was happy to hear the senior officials in Helsinki speak about this long-term strategy.
Regarding the question about Putin, if he passes away in a few years, I really hope he has a long and healthy life because I want him to sit in prison for everything he’s done. I want to see his face when he sits in the same dock where Milosevic sat, where Duterte will sit soon. I want him to sit there, too. I want all the people who lost their loved ones in Ukraine, the families of Boris Nemtsov, Alexei Navalny, and all the victims of this criminal regime, to see his face when he sits on trial.
I think that's the core of our conversation today. There needs to be a roadmap for the day after Putin. Whoever comes after will bring a policy change—that’s how it always happens in Russia, over 200 years. That doesn’t mean the policy will be great, but there will be a window of opportunity. We must use it correctly and not repeat the mistakes made in the 1990s by Yeltsin’s government and by the West.
This roadmap for domestic change, accountability, transparency, and reflection on all the crimes—it’s up to us. But it’s also up to the West to help guide that transition. It’s in everyone’s interest to support a democratic Russia and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. The only way to have a free, peaceful Europe is with a democratic Russia as part of it. That’s the goal we should all be working towards together. Thank you so much.
Lyubov Sobol 1:48:38
Thank you. I totally agree with Vladimir Kalamosa, and I just want to mention that I believe in a post-Putin Russia. I believe that democracy will happen in Russia, and we should fight for it—it’s worth fighting for. Arizina Valley also believed in the Russian people and in Russia, which is why they are here on Russia four years ago.
Thank you for this conversation. I think it’s really important to support the idea that after Putin, Russia’s future is not a dream, and it could be a positive one. Thank you.
Marianna Yarovskaya 1:49:27
To sort of summarize both of your positions, I wanted to tell a short story. There’s always a "behind the scenes" when you’re filming. When I was at Stanford, at the Hoover Institution, we were introduced to Peter Robinson, who used to write Reagan's speeches. He was the one who, when he was 20 years old, wrote the famous speech: “Mr. President, tear down this wall.” So, he obviously knows how to put something concisely.
He said to Luba that Russian history is indeed cyclical. As he observes it over the past 150 years, he noted that democratic Russia exists in parallel with authoritarian Russia. Sometimes they come closer together, then recede, and sometimes they come closer again. We've seen that during Khrushchev's thaw and during the 90s. He explained that while authoritarian regimes claim to represent Russian history, the democratic opposition is just as much a part of that history. He said, "They might be right that they are part of history, but so are you." I think it's important to document these stories, because they are part of Russia's history as well.Thank you.
Maria Alyokhina 1:51:06
I think it's crucial for Europe to protect itself first and foremost and to understand that it is genuinely in danger. Just remember 2014, when Crimea was annexed, and there was no proper response from the West, no clear condemnation that it was wrong to take the territory of another country. There were no significant sanctions, no personal sanctions, no embargo on Russian resources, and so on. Because of that, they continued the war in the east, and after some preparation, they launched the full-scale invasion.
Now, there’s talk of freezing the conflict—talking about 30 days, etc. But it’s not possible to make a deal with Putin. He will take advantage of any opportunity. Especially with the Trump government, the situation becomes even more dangerous. Going back to the question about Finland, just imagine a scenario where NATO doesn’t protect you. What would that mean? You need to first understand that this situation could potentially become real—it’s not an illusion.
And the discussion about a ceasefire does not address the fact that more than 10,000 people are held in secret concentration camps inside Russia. These people are detained without proper investigation or court proceedings. They are kept in penal colonies and pre-trial detention centers, often after other prisoners are cleared out to make room for them. They are tortured, and many commit suicide. There are unbelievably horrific stories—stories of rape, torture. These are real, and they are happening now, but they remain completely hidden from public view.
These people aren't even a part of the discussion when it comes to peace talks. Also, the kidnapped children whose names and identities are changed—many parents are desperately searching for them. Organizations researching this issue are now struggling to continue their work due to lack of funding, especially with the new geopolitical power dynamics, including the shifting influence of the United States.
Dr. Pavel Podvig:
Well, I think we all wish we could have ended on a more positive note, but that's the reality we’re facing. And, again, that’s life. However, I believe everyone here eventually agreed that the best way forward is to work toward a democratic Russia. By doing so, we can hopefully address most, if not all, of the issues we are facing today.Thank you very much for your attention, and thanks to the panelists.